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THE UNIFORM TRUST RECEIPTS ACT
AS ADOPTED IN WISCONSIN
I
THE BACKGROUND
In the United States, the trust receipt originated as a financing
device for the importation of goods from foreign sellers. In the
typical transaction the importer requested his bank to send a letter
of credit to the foreign seller, authorizing it to draw its drafts on the
bank for the cost of specified goods to be supplied to the importer. The
seller shipped the goods, drew a draft on the importer's bank, attached
a bill of lading to the order of the bank to the draft and forwarded it
through banking channels for payment. The bank paid the draft, took
possession of the bill of lading and notified the importer when the
goods arrived. The importer then executed to the bank a trust receipt,
which acknowledged that title to the goods was in the bank and that
the goods were received in trust for some specified purpose (usually
their sale in the ordinary course of trade). The trust receipt further
provided that the bank could take possession of the goods at-any time
until they were delivered to a purchaser and the proceeds received, and
that, after the proceeds were received, the bank could take possession
of such proceeds. Upon execution of the trust receipt, the bank in-
dorsed the bill of lading to the importer, who acquired possession of
the goods and used them in accord with the purpose expressed in the
trust receipt. The typical purpose being one of sale, the importer sold
the goods-usually to a person having no knowledge of the financing
arrangement-and used the proceeds to satisfy his debt to the bank.
Thus the transaction was completed and the trust receipt was can-
celled.' It will be observed that in its origin the trust receipt trans-
action was tripartite one: involving a distant seller, a financing
agency (called the "entruster") and a domestic purchaser (called the
"trustee"). It will also be noted that legal title to the goods never
rested in the trustee.
The trust receipt device is no longer restricted to importing situa-
tions; it is being used with greater and greater frequency in the field
of domestic financing, especially that of automobile dealers. The typi-
cal trust receipt transaction today may involve, for example, General
Motors as the distant seller, General Motors Acceptance Corporation
as the entruster, and a local dealer in General Motors automobiles as
trustee for the purpose of sale. It is this large scale entrance into the
field of domestic financing that makes the subject of trust receipts more
important than ever before.
'Cf. Frederick, The Trust Receipt as Security, 22 COL. L. Rzv. 395-8 (1922);
9A U.L.A. 274 (1951).
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The growing popularity of trust receipts in the domestic financing
field unfortunately has not met with consistent reactions on the parts
of the various courts. Confronted with this novel security device,
many courts have lost sight of the fundamental characteristic of the
trust receipt transaction-namely that it is a tripartite arrangement, the
trustee never getting the legal title-and have tried to fit it into the
straight jacket of some more familiar device. In different courts, the
trust receipt transaction has been variously viewed as a bailment for
sale,2 a chattel mortgage, 3 a conditional sale 4 a pledge,5 or as "an in-
dependent type of security device not falling in any of the established
categories, the borrower having the beneficial interest in the goods, and
the lender having a security title derived not from the borrower himself
but from a third person."16 The result of some of the above analyses
was to recognize the trust receipt as a valid incumbrance even in the
absence of recording ;7 the result of others was to declare trust re-
ceipts void as secret liens unless recorded in compliance with condi-
tional sales or chattel mortgage statutes.8 At any rate, the status of
trust receipts in states which had not ruled on them was so highly
questionable as often not to justify risking their use. Further, aside
from this confusion in the states which had neither rejected nor ac-
cepted the trust receipt device, there were many uncertainties in the use
of that device even in those states which recognized its validity with-
out recordation. There was, for example, the rule at common law that
it was absolutely necessary for the validity of the transaction that the
legal title never get into the trustee :9 if the trustee acquired the legal
title, even for an instant, the trust receipt would be held to be a chattel
mortgage subject to the applicable recording statutes.'0 This situation
created overly technical difficulties which were not justified by the
substance of the transaction: in many cases the entruster could never
be sure that the arrangement was legally valid.
To resolve these difficulties and to provide a pattern for the solu-
tion of other trust receipt problems, the Commissioners on Uniform
2 General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Hupfer, 113 Neb. 228, 202 N.W.
627 (1925) ; Commercial Credit Company v. Interstate Securities Co., 197 S.W.
2d 1000 (Mo. App. 1946).3 G.M.A.C. v. Berry, 86 N.H. 280, 167 A. 553 (1933); cf. Smith v. Commercial
Credit Corp., 113 N.J.Eq. 12, 165 A. 637 (1933).4 G.M.A.C. v. Whitely, 217 Iowa 998, 252 N.W. 779 (1934) ; G.M.A.C. v. May-berry, 195 N.C. 508, 142 S.E. 767 (1928); Ohio Savings Bank & Trust Co. v.
Schneider, 202 Iowa 938, 211 N.W. 248 (1926).
5 See Hanna, Trust Receipts, 29 Cot. L. REv. 545, 550-4 (1929).6 Note, 44 HARv. L. REv. 304 (1930) ; see also, In re A. E. Fountain, Inc., 282
Fed. 816 (2d Cir. 1922).
7Walton v. Commercial Credit Co., 68 S.D. 151, 299 N.W. 300 (1941).
8 G.M.A.C. v. Berry, supra note 3.
9 In re James, Inc., 30 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1929) ; In re A. E. Fountain, Inc., supra
note 6.
10 See 10 Am. Jur-, Chattel Mortgages §15, p. 727.
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State Laws in 1933 adopted the Uniform Trust Receipts Act,"' which
defines the rights and duties of trust receipt financing in great detail.
Last year the Wisconsin Legislature adopted the Uniform Trust Re-
ceipts Act as chapter 490 of the Laws of 1953, becoming the 33rd juris-
diction to adopt it.' 2 The act is complex' 3 and comprehensive. An
attempt will be made here to summarize its provisions and the cases
interpreting it.
II
THE NATURE OF THE TRANSACTION UNDER WISCONSIN'S UNIFORM
TRUST RECEIPT ACT
A. Incomplete Pledge Transactions.
The Uniform Trust Receipts Act is not restricted in its operation
strictly to trust receipt transactions. it applies also to situations in-
volving the attempted creation or continuance of a pledge without de-
livery to or retention of possession by the pledgee. 14 This particular
application of the Act will be discussed only at this point; the balance
of this paper will be devoted to the sections of the Act which are
concerned with trust receipts as such.
The Act provides 5 that where an attempted pledge or agreement
to pledge unaccompanied by possession in the pledgee fails also to
qualify as a trust receipt transaction, it will nevertheless be valid as
against creditors of the pledgor as follows:
1) if the pledgee has given new value, the transaction will be valid
to the extent of the new value, as against the pledgor's creditors,
with or without notice, for a period of 10 days from the giving of
the new value;
2) where the 10 days in 1) has expired, or where the value given
by the pledgee is not new, the pledge is valid as against lien
creditors without notice, as defined in the Act,' 6 only as of the time
the pledgee takes possession and without relation back.
Bona fide purchasers (defined by the Act to include entrusters) take
"11933 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS, p. 244n.
12 The other jurisdictions are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecti-
cut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington and
Wyoming. See 1954 Pocket Part to 9A U.L.A.
'3 Bogert, in The Effect of the Trust Receipts Act, 3 UNIV. OF CHI. L. REv. 26,
tells that the governor of the state of Illinois felt obliged to allow the Act to
become law without his signature in view of its complicated nature. "The Uni-
form Trust Receipts Act is a perplexing maze of technical phrases wholly
incomprehensible without an extensive study of the background and develop-
ment of the security device known as the trust receipt." In re Chappell, 77
F.Supp. 573, 575 (D.C. Ore. 1948).
14Uniform Trust Receipts Act §3; Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.33.
15U.T.R.A. §3(1); Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.33(1).16 U.T.R.A. §1: Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.31(6). U.T.R.A. §8; Wis. STATS. (1953)
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free of the pledgee's interest unless the pledgee has reduced the subject
of the pledge to possession before the purchase.1 7
A common situation in which banks temporarily release collateral
for the purpose of presentation, collection or renewal", is provided for
in the general terms of section 241.33(3). That section declares that
where a security interest holder delivers the subject of his interest to
the person holding the beneficial interest therein, and the circumstances
do not constitute a trust receipt transaction, the transaction will be
treated the same as an attempted pledge or agreement to pledge, for
new value, as above. This means that the interest will subsist against
all creditors of the beneficial interest holder for a period of 10 days, 9
or, after the 10 days have expired, as against lien creditors without
notice20 from the time the security interest holder reacquires possession
of the property, without relation back.
To the extent covered by the Act, the common law rules: 1) that
the validity of a pledge depends upon delivery, actual or constructive,
of the property to the pledgee ;21 and 2) that a pledge is discharged by
the surrender of the pledged property to the pledgor 22 have been abro-
gated. The only case construing this section held that where the owner
of property subject to a pledge pledged his remaining interest to
another by execution of a contract to that effect, the pledge to the
second pledgee was perfected by possession within the meaning of
§3(1) (b), U.T.R.A., 23 as of the time it was made, although physical
possession of the property was not acquired until after the pledgor had
gone into bankruptcy.24
B. Transactions Not Falling Within the Act.
1. Where possession of the subject matter is- not given to the
trustee for one of the purposes enumerated in the Act.
The Act provides that no trust receipt transaction exists unless the
possession of the subject matter has been given to the trustee for one
of the following purposes:
(a) in the case of goods, documents or instruments, for
their sale or exchange;
§241.38, broadens the concept to include certain creditors' representatives
whether or not they have had notice in fact.
1 U.T.R.A. §3(2) ; Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.33(2).
s See 9A U.L.A. 275 (1951).
'9 U.T.R.A. §3(1) (a); Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.33(1) (a).
20 See supra note 16.
21 Geilfuss v. Corrigan, 95 Wis. 651, 70 N.W. 306 (1897) ; Dale v. Pattison, 234
U.S. 399 (1914).22Gregory v. Morris, 96 U.S. 619 (1877) ; Hubbard v. Tod, 171 U.S. 474 (1898).
23 WIS. STATS. (1953) §241.33 (1) (b).
24 Gins v. Mauser Plumbing Supply Co., 148 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1945), noted in
45 Co. L. REv. 967 (1945). For further example of the protection given by
courts to the pledgee's equitable interest as against the trustee in bankruptcy
by the fiction of "relation back" see Goldstein v. Rusch, 56 F.2d 10 (2d Cir.
1932).
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(b) in the case of goods or documents representing goods,
for manufacturing or processing for ultimate sale or for
loading, transporting, storing, etc., in a manner preliminary
to or necessary for sale;
(c) in the case of instruments,
(i) for the purpose of delivering them to a principal
under whom the trustee is holding them, or
(ii) for the purpose of consummating a transaction in-
volving delivery to a depository or a registrar, or
(iii) for their presentatfon, collection or renewal. s
The theory that is evident from these provisions is that the trust re-
ceipt was intended under the Act chiefly for the use of dealers and
manufacturers in financing their inventories, and for the use of banks
in releasing collateral to borrowers for temporary purposes. That is to
say that the Act was meant to apply where the parties occupy the
positions of lender and borrower.28
2. Purchase money mortgages, conditional sales transactions,
bailments and consignments for sale.
In the section defining "entruster" the Act excludes purchase
money mortgages and conditional sales contracts from its coverage.
2 7
That section is very broad and excludes any transaction in which a
person engaged in the business of selling goods or instruments for
profit, who has at the outset a general property interest in the goods or
instruments as against the buyer, sells to the buyer and retains title
or a security interest. Any question this section might raise with re-
spect to consignments for sale is resolved by a later sections which
declares that bailments and consignments are excluded from coverage
of the Act where the bailor or consignor does not retain title to
secure an indebtedness to him of the bailee or consignee.
3. Where the agreement giving rise to the transaction is not
written.
The Act provides that between the entruster and the trustee the
terms of the trust receipt shall be valid and enforceable. 29 But in order
to be valid, the trust receipt must be in writing, must designate the
subjects affected and must recite that the entruster's security interest
remains or will remain in him or has passed or will pass to him.30 It
has been held that where the parties had orally agreed to a financing
25U.T.R.A. §2(3); WIS. STATS. (1953) §241.32(3).
26 See Bogert, op. cit. supra note 13, p. 38; 1938 HANDBOOK, p. 105; cf. Commer-
cial Credit Corp. v. Horan, 325 Ill. App. 625, 60 N.E. 2d 763 (1945); In re
Chappell, 77 F.Supp. 573 (D.C. Ore. 1948).
27 U.T.R.A. §1; Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.31 (3).
28 U.T.R.A. §15; Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.45.
29 U.T.R.A. §5; Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.35.
3U.T.R.A. §2(1) (b) (1) ; Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.32(1) (c)(1).
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arrangement which was in substance an unwritten trust receipt trans-
action, common law principles applied instead of the Uniform Trust
Receipts Act.31 It should also be noted that while a contract to give
a trust receipt is equivalent in all respects to a trust receipt, when the
property has been delivered to or the security interest has passed from
the trustee, it must be in writing and signed by the trustee to have that
effect.32
4. Where the obligation secured under the purported trust
receipt transaction is an unsecured past indebtedness or a
future indebtedness.
The entruster's security interest may extend against both purchasers
and creditors to obligations for which the subject matter of the trust
receipt transaction was security or to obligations arising from the
transfer or agreement to transfer new value.3 3 But other than that, the
security interest may not extend to past or future indebtedness.3 4
5. Where there is a single transaction of pledge, the entruster
is a natural person and the trustee is his fiduciary for handling
his investments or finances.
The Act explicitly excludes single transactions of legal or equitable
pledge between an entruster who is a natural person and a trustee who
is the entruster's fiduciary for investment or financial management
where there is no existing course of business. This exclusion holds
good whether the transactions are unaccompanied by delivery of pos-
session, or involve constructive delivery, or delivery and redelivery,
actual or constructive.35
-'Associates Discount Corp. v. C. E. Fay Co., 307 Mass. 577, 30 N.E. 2d 876
(1941).
32U.T.R.A. §4(1); Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.34(1); cf. U.T.R.A. §2(1) (c) (2);
Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.32(1) (C) (2).
33 U.T.R.A. §14; Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.44.
34 Ibid.
35U.T.R.A. §15; Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.45. A fact situation described as
being not unlike the one contemplated by this section may be found in Sammet
v. Mayer, 108 F.2d 337, 341n.7 (2d Cir. 1940). In that case, two partners gave
a lender their note reciting that certain stock certificates -%ere collateral there-
for, placed the certificates in an envelope and retained possession of the en-
velope. The court did not feel called upon to decide whether or not the Act
applied, since the result in the case, as decided on the basis of other law, was
the same as it would have been under the Act, namely that the transaction
was invalid as against creditors, under New York law which required an
instrument to be filed embodying the terms of the transaction. In the 1930
HANDBOOK, pp. 289-290, the draftsman of the Act had this to say: "It would
be undesirable for the Act to disturb the present law on constructive de-
livery of pledges of security papers between individuals personally unac-
customed to the transaction of business, and their agents handling their
affairs. In such situations, the cases have repeatedly, and with some justice,
worked out sufficient 'delivery' under a pledge by the segregation and marking
of securities. Whether "this be wise or unwise, it is believed that a regulation
of the situation had no place in this Act, and that applicable local law should
stand."
1954]
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C. Ways in Which Trust Receipt Transactions May Arise Under
the Act.
The Act specifies in precise terms the situations which are desig-
nated as Trust Receipt Transactions. 8 Basically, under the Act as
adopted in Wisconsin, a trust receipt transaction can arise in any one
of four ways, assuming that the other essentials are present, e.g., that
the trust receipt is in writing,37 and the transaction is effected for one
of the purposes required.3 Each of the four ways will be discussed
separately.
1. Where the entruster has a security interest in goods, docu-
ments or instruments and releases possession to the trustee.
When the creditor in possession of security, a pledgee or a chattel
mortgagee, of goods, documents, or instruments releases them to the
debtor, extinguishes his security interest and takes in return a trust
receipt, the Act recognizes the arrangement as a valid trust receipt
transaction.3 9  It is to be noted that this type of situation differs
from that dealt with above under "Incomplete Pledge Transactions," 40
in which a creditor also release security to his debtor, in that here all
the technical requirements of a trust receipt transaction must be com-
plied with: i.e., the security must be released for one of the purposes
specified by section 241.32(3), etc.
2. Where the entruster for new value acquires by the trans-
action a security interest in goods, documents or instruments -
or, as a result of the transaction, is to acquire such security
interest promptly - and the entruster or a third person de-
livers the goods, documents or instruments to the trustee.
The traditional trust receipt situation, outlined in Part I of this
paper, falls under the section of the Act which provides that a valid
trust receipt transaction may arise where delivery of goods, documents
or instruments is made to the trustee by the entruster or a third party,
and the entruser, for new value, acquires a security interest therein.41
However, the provision in the Act covers a broader situation than the
one outlined. By including within its coverage situations in which a
security interest will be acquired by the entruster promptly after the
transaction, 42 this section removes the common law stumbling block
which nullified the transaction if title rested in the trustee before pas-
sage to the entruster.43 This position is made even clearer by the pro-
36 .T.R.A. §2: Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.32.
3 See supra note 25.38U.T.R.A. §2(3); Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.32(3).
39U.T.R.A. §2(1)(a); Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.32(1) (a).
40 See part II A. of this paper.
41 U.T.R.A. §2(1)(a) ; Wis. STATs. (1953) §241.32(1) (a).
42 Ibid.
43 Supra note 9.
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vision 44 that the security interest of the entruster may be derived from
the trustee or from any other person.
3. Where new value is given by the entruster for a security
interest in documents or instruments in the possession of the
trustee, the possession of which is retained by the trustee.
The third situation recognized by the Act as a valid trust receipt
transaction is that in which the entruster gives new value in return for
a security interest in instruments or documents (not goods) actually
exhibited to him or his agent at his place of business or that of his
agent, and allows the trustee to retain possession of them for one of
the purposes enumerated in section 241.32(3) .45 While the intent of the
draftman of the Act was avowedly to restrict the operation of this
section "to the case of new acquisition by the dealer," or "to the turn-
ing back of security already pledged,' 46 one commentator has ex-
pressed his fear that the use of the phrase, "or documents," might
open the door to "masquerading chattel mortgages.14 7 His theory is
that a dealer might warehouse his goods and then exhibit the ware-
house receipt to a finance company for the purpose of getting a loan.
Whether this section by itself would warrant such a transaction is
unimportant in Wisconsin since a unique provision in the Wisconsin
version of the Act makes resort to such devious devices unnecessary.
This provision, under which what is in effect a chattel mortgage may
be effected by a trust receipt, will next be discussed.
4. Where the entruster gives new value in return for a security
interest in goods or documents possession of which is in and
remains in the trustee.
The Wisconsin Act, along with the Acts of a few other states s4
differs from the Uniform Act in adding a fourth type of trust receipt
transaction: one which will allow the use of a trust receipt to effect
the equivalent of a chattel mortgage. 49 The section which permits this
provides that a trust receipt transaction is a transaction whereby:
"(c) The entruster gives new value in reliance upon the trans-
fer by the trustee to such entruster of a security interest in goods
44U.T.R.A. §2(1) (b) (2) ; Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.32(1) (c) (3).45U.T.R.A. §2(1) (b) ; Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.32(1) (b).
46 1933 HANDBOOK, p. 249.
4 Bacon, A Trust Receipt Transaction, 5 FoRD. L. Rxv. 240, 252-3 (1936).
48 E.g., Connecticut, Illinois and Indiana. See 9A U.L.A.. 290-1 (1951).
49 "In Connecticut, Illinois and Indiana, the uniform act was adopted with a
substantial change by the addition of a new sub-paragraph (c) to section 2(1)
which permits the use of a trust receipt where goods or documents are al-
ready owned by and are in the possession of the trustee. This places goods
and documents in these three states on the same footing enjoyed by instru-
ments under section 2(1) (b) and authorizes the use of a trust receipt in the
normal chattel mortgage loan transaction between entruster and trustee." Pro-
ceedings of the Section bf Corporation, Banking and Mercantile Law of the
American Bar Association, 1945, p. 115.
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or documents in possession of the trustee and possession of
which is retained by the trustee." 50 (Emphasis added.)
It should, of course, be noted that the trust receipt itself must still be
in writing,51 and possession retained by the trustee must still be for one
of the purposes enumerated in section 241.32(3). But if these require-
ments are satisfied, the result is a secret lien on the goods of the trustee
subject only to the qualifications of the filing sections of the Act.52 This
possibility presents definite advantages to commercial lenders and bor-
rowers because it relaxes the burdensome and sometimes embarrassing
recording requirements that chattel mortgages involve, but subsequent
creditors of the trustee are placed at somewhat of a disadvantage be-
cause of the difficulty in determining which of the trustee's assets are
subject to another's lien. The draftsman of the Act described this sort
of amendment as "disemboweling" and emphasized that the Act was
never intended to enter into the field of chattel mortgage financing,5 3
but the Wisconsin Legislature has seen fit to ignore his arguments, and
has chosen to adopt the Act with this amendment attached.
An interesting case construing this section is a California case,
Chichester v. Commercial Credit Co.54 In that case the Chrysler Cor-
poration shipped automobiles to a dealer along with invoices made out
to the dealer, but made out and sent the bills of lading to Commercial
Credit Co., a company engaged in the business of financing the dealer's
new cars. The dealer executed trust receipts and took possession of
the automobiles, but went into bankruptcy before he could sell them.
Commercial Credit Co. then took possession of the automobiles pur-
suant to the terms of the trust receipt. This action arose when the
trustee in bankruptcy of the dealer sued the finance company in con-
50 WIS. STATS. (1953) §241.32(1) (c).
51 Supra note 30.
52 See infra section III of this paper.
53 1938 HANDBOOK, p. 105. He refers to the adoption of amendments such as this
as a situation unique in the experience of the commissioners: the situation
... is this, that an act prepared to cover new financing only, of newly bought
goods, bought by dealers, and limited in its entire effect and in its entire policy
to the proposition that new assets coming in, purchase money mortgage stuff,
purchase money lien stuff, could legitimately be given a preferred position be-
cause it deceived no one in a line in which that line of financing was familiar;
that an act prepared along such lines has been exposed to a concentrated, uni-
form, well-backed attempt at amendment which blasted, where the amendment
is adopted into the field of secret mortgage on a stock in trade, on any stock
in trade, with no semblance of purchase money aspect to the deal.
"That set of amendments has been informally combated by your section
wherever they raised their head and for several years with no effect. The
Trust Receipts Acts as adopted has, I think I am correct in saying, in two-
thirds of the cases contained these amendments which I can only describe as
disemboweling."
54 37 Cal. App. 2d 439, 99 P.2d 1083 (1940). The subsection construed was re-
pealed in 1939 by the California Legislature in an attempt to bring the Act
into accord with the views of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws as
indicated supra note 53. However, the substance of this subsection is restored
to the California Code in CAL. CIv. CODE (1949) §3014.5; but the operation of
the present subsection is limited to motor vehicle transactions.
[Vol. 38
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version for wrongfully having taken possession of the automobiles.
The trial court decided that the title to the cars was at all times in the
finance company; the appellate court did not disturb that decision. But
the appellate court went further and concluded that the source of the
defendant finance company's title was of no importance:
"Although the trial court found that defendant was at all times
the owner of the automobiles in question, it was of no conse-
quence whether defendant's title originated with the Chrysler
Corporation or with Reagan [the dealer]."55
D. Terms.
At this point it should be noted that the terminology employed by
the Act in defining the nature of a trust receipt transacion is of a tech-
nical kind and should be examined closely in order to avoid confusion.
Section 241.31 of the Act defines many of the terms used. The terms
of particular interest with respect to the question of the trust receipt
transaction itself are: entruster, trustee, goods, documents, instruments,
new value and security interest. They will be discussed individually:
1. Entruster, as defined in section 241.31(3), is the person or his
successor in interest, who has taken a security interest in goods, docu-
ments or instruments under a trust receipt transaction. Conditional
sales vendors and purchase money mortgagees are excluded where they
(a) are in the business of selling goods or instruments for a profit, (b)
have, at the outset of the transaction, general property as against the
buyer in the goods or instruments, and (c) sell them to the buyer on
credit retaining a security interest.56 Nor does the term include a
bailor or consignor where title is not retained to secure an indebtedness
to him of the bailee or consignee.57 Nor does it include the type of
individual discussed above in Section II B. 5 of this paper.
2. Trustee is defined to be the person having or taking possession
of goods documents or instruments under a trust receipt transaction,
and any successor in interest of such person.58 Any suspicion that this
sort of trustee is in any way related to a strict trustee is set to rest in
the next sentence, which declares that the use of the word "trustee"
shall not be construed to imply the existence of a trust in the sense of
equity jurisprudence except as otherwise provided.59
3. Goods, Documents, Instruments.
(a) "Goods" are any chattels personal with the exception
of money, choses in action and fixtures.60
55 99 P.2d at 1086; cf. In re Boswell, 96 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1938).
56 U.T.R.A. §1; Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.31(3).
57UT.A. §15; Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.45.5sU.T.R.A. §1; Wis. STAT . (1953) §241.31 (14).
59 Ibid. Cf. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 266-7 (1935).
6o U.T.R.A. §1; Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.31(4).
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(b) "Documents" are any documents of title to goods,6 '
e.g., bills of lading, warehouses receipts, etc.
(c) "Instruments" includes: (i) negotiable instruments as
defined in the negotiable instruments law; (ii) stocks, bonds
or debentures issued as part of a series, (iii) interim, de-
deposit or participation certificates. Documents of title to
goods are expressly excluded from the meaning of this
term.a"
4. New Value is a very important term used to determine whether
a transaction falls under the Act. Under most sections of the Act63 a
transaction is disqualified if the value given by the entruster is not new.
Under the Wisconsin Act this term includes new advances and loans,
their renewals and extensions, or new obligations incurred, or the re-
lease of a valid security interest, or the release of a claim to proceeds of
a prior trust receipt transaction allowed by section 241.40.64 This pro-
vision differs materially from that of the Uniform Act in that the
latter declares that "new value" shall not be construed to include ex-
tensions or renewals of existing obligations of the trustee, nor obliga-
tions substituted for such existing obligations.6 5 The result of the Wis-
consin provision is to broaden further the scope of coverage of the Act.
5. Security Interest under the Act is a rather broad term which
means a property interest in the subject matter of the trust receipt,
limited to securing the performance of an obligation. It includes the
interest of a pledgee and also includes title where taken or retained for
security purposes only.66 It, therefore, covers situations in which the
entruster has not taken title, but only a lien on property as security for
a loan.
67
III
FILING REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE ACT
The filing requirements of the Act are rather unique in that they
do not demand that each trust receipt be recorded or even that notice
of each trust receipt transaction or a description of the goods covered
be recorded. To comply with the Act it is necessary only to file with the
Secretary of State a statement that the parties expect to engage in
61U.T.R.A. §1; Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.31 (2).
62U.T.R.A. §1; WIs. STATS. (1953) §241.31(5).
63 See, e.g., U.T.R.A. §§2 (1) (a) and 2 (1)(b) ; WIs. STATS. (1953) §§241.32 (1)
(a), 241.32(1) (b) and 241.32(1) (c).
64 WTs. STATS. (1953) §241.31(7).
65U.T.R.A. §1.
6G Ibid.; Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.31(12).
67 "It is clear from these provisions of the act that, in a trust receipt transaction,
the security interest which the entruster has may be either in the nature of a
lien upon the goods or the title to the goods, whenever such title shall be in
substance taken or retained for security only." Premium Commercial Corp.
v. Kasprzycki, 129 Conn. 446, 29 A.2d 610, 614 (1942); Bank of America Na-
tional Trust and Savings Ass'n v. National Funding Corporation, 45 Cal. App.
2d 320, 114 P.2d 49 (1941).
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trust receipt transactions." This notice need be in no particular form,69
but must be signed by both parties 70 and must contain the following
information: 1) the names of the entruster and the trustee ;71 2) the
chief place of business of each of the parties ;72 3) a statement that the
parties expect to engage or are engaged in trust receipt financing;"3
and 4) a description of what type or types of goods or documents will
be the subject of the transactions. 74 When this statement is presented
to the office of the Secretary of State, with two dollars filing fee,7 5 it
is deemed to have been filed in favor of entruster with respect to any
of the type of goods or documents described which are or have been
the subject of a trust receipt transaction within 30 days before or one
year after..76 At any time within a year of filing, the entruster may by
himself renew the filing for another year by filing an affidavit to the
same effect as a the statement originally filed. He may, of course, file
a statement similar to the first one, signed by both himself and the
trustee, but he need not. When this affidavit or statement is filed, it
extends the effect of the filing for another year and retains for the
entruster his rank as against junior interest holders.77
The effect of this revolutionary sort of recording requirement is to
allow to the entruster a secret lien78 on the subject matter of the trans-
action for a period of 30 days, since no filing of any kind is required
within that period in order to preserve his interest. Further, even after
the 30 days have passed, the specific goods covered by the transaction
need not be described in particular in the statement filed in order for
the filing to constitute constructive notice of the proposed methods of
financing and any rights that may be acquired thereunder.79 Filing
68U.T.R.A. §13; Wis. STATs. (1953) §241.43. Note that under this section only
statements regarding transactions involving goods or documents may be filed.
69 A form is suggested in U.T.R.A. §13(2); Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.43(2).
,OU.T.R.A. §13(1); Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.43(1).
71U.T.R.A. §13(1) (a); Wis. STATs. (1953) §241.43(1) (a).
72 Ibid.
73 U.T.R.A. §13(1) (b); Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.43(1) (b).
74 U.T.R.A. §13-S"c); Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.43(1) (c).
75 U.T.R.A. §13 (3); WIs. STATS. (1953) §241.43(3).
76 U.T.R.A. §13(4); WIs. STATS. (1953) §241.43(4).77U.T.R.A. §13(5); WIs. STATS. (1953) §241.43(5).
78 Cf. Donn v. Auto Dealers Inv. Co., 385 Ill. 211, 52 N.E.2d 695, 696 (1944),
"The apparent purpose in permitting filing of a statement by such financier
and dealers is to have some method of giving notice to other prospective
creditors that the former are doing business by the trust receipt financing
method. The purpose seems to have been to retain the advantages of a
security interest in goods by the use of the trust receipt, and yet to eliminate,
as far as possible, both secret liens and the necessity of recording each trans-
action."
79Universal Credit Co. v. Citizens State Bank of Petersburg, 224 Ind. 1, 64
N.E.2d 28 (1946). These lax requirements are, nevertheless, thought to be
sufficient, things being what they are: "Although this method is unusual, it
seems to be adequate. Buyers from the trustee who pay cash for the goods or
who buy on credit are given protection against the entruster whether there
has been a filing or not; prospective creditors, mortgagees, and pledgees of the
trustee and persons who propose to take from him in cancellation of in-
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after the 30 days is valid, but the interest of the entruster is deemed to
have been created by the trustee at the time of filing, without relation
back to the time of the transaction. 80 If the entruster takes possession
of the subject matter of the transaction, it is deemed the equivalent of
filing, with respect to goods and documents, and notice, with respect to
instruments, for as long as he retains possession."'
In view of these loose requirements, it is not surprising that the
tendency of the courts seems to be toward a strict construction of the
filing provisions. The Massachusetts Court, confronted with a case in
which a corporate trustee, whose true name was "E. R. Millen, Co.,
Inc.," was designated in the statement filed as "E. R. Millen, Co.," and
in its signature thereto as "E. R. Millen, Trustee," held that the filing
of the statement was insufficient to impart constructive notice to lien
creditors.8 2 In coming to this conclusion, the court emphasized the
necessity of strict construction for making uniformity of construction
throughout the country more realizable:
"This, we must bear in mind, is a uniform law. No pertinent
decision has come to our attention. But it cannot-be doubted that
the statute must be construed in a way that will tend to uniform
decisions in the several states. Any relaxation in strict interpre-
tation tends, in a given case, to carry in the opposite direction
and, for future cases, to open the door wider to still other
variations. '1 3
The court went on to decide, however, that inaccuracy in the signature
of a party to the trust receipt itself would not affect the validity be-
tween the parties, in the absence of fraud.
Although the Act states that the description of the subject matter
may be general (such as "coffee," "silk," "automobiles," or the like) , 4
it may not be so general that the nature of the goods or documents is
not apparent. A 1934 opinion of the New York Attorney General 5
expressed the feeling that a more detailed description was required than
general terms like "merchandise" or "appliances." More recently, how-
ever, a California cases 6 has defined this requirement somewhat more
exactly:
"The only notice given to the public of the possible existence of
a trust receipt transaction or lien, is in the notice filed with the
debtedness can learn from the record that merchandise he has on hand cannot
be relied upon, and then make further investigation. 'All these are persons
whose business it is to look up the status of any trustee with whom they aredealing'." Bacon, op. cit. supra note 49, p. 265, quoting 1933 HANDBOOK, p. 253.
80 U.T.R.A. §7(1) (b) ; Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.37(1) (b).
81 U.T.R.A. §7(2); WIs. STATS. (1953) §241.37(2).82 G.M.A.C. v. Haley, 329 Mass. 559, 109 N.E.2d 143 (1953), noted in 52 MIcH.
L. REv. 161 (1954).
83 109 N.E.2d at 146.
84 U.T.R.A. §13(2); Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.43(2).85 1935 N.Y. Op. A-rry. GEN. 236; See 9A U.L.A. 313 (1951).86In re San Clemente Electric Supply Co., 101 F.Supp. 252 (D.C. Calif. 1952).
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Secretary of State. This section does not even require a detailed
description of the individual property, but since it requires a des-
cription of the kinds of goods covered, it certainly must be
strictly construed."87
In conformity with the view thus expressed, the court then decided
that, where the statement filed with the Secretary of State described
the following goods: "Radios, stoves, washers, refrigerators, ice boxes
and other gas and electric equipment," trust receipts covering non-
electrical water softeners were not protected.
The Act contains another unique filing section;88 it provides that
where a trust receipt transaction is of such a nature as to fall also
under another law requiring recording or filing, the entruster need not
comply with both, but may comply with either at his election. He then
gets the protection of the law complied with.8 9
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE PARTIES TO THE TRANSACTION
A. In General.
Fundamentally, the right-duty relationship created by the trust re-
ceipt transaction is very similar to that created by other credit trans-
actions whereby the ownership of a chattel has been split. The risk
of loss is generally held to fall upon the trustee.90 The entruster's se-
curity interest is limited to securing the performance of the trustee's
obligation, even though the interest is in terms of absolute title.91 The
interest of the trustee is obviously such that when he pays the amount
due, the subject matter of the transaction is free from any incum-
brance in favor of the entruster. Further, if the entruster takes pos-
session of the subject matter of the transaction wrongfully before
default of the trustee, it seems clear that the entruster is a converter,
and that the remedies of conversion and replevin are open to the
trustee.
92
B. The Entruster's Rights on Default.
Upon the trustee's default, the entruster becomes entitled to pos-
session of the subject matter of the transaction.93 The means by which
he may properly acquire possession are not specified; 14 but once he
does, the Act provides that pending a sale he holds the property with the
87 101 F.Supp. at 256.
18sU.T.R.A. §16; WIS. STATS. (1953) §241.46.
89 Except as to buyers in the ordinary course of business described in section
241.39(2) and lienors as described in section 241.41, who are protected by the
provisions of the Trust Receipts Act no matter which filing or recording law
the entruster has elected to comply with.
90 For a pre-U.T.R.A. case, see Matter of McElheny, 91 App. Div. 131, 86 N.Y.S.
326 (1904). The Act does not treat this question.
91 U.T.R.A. §1 ; Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.31(12).
92 Cf. U.T.R.A. §6(3) (c); Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.36(2)(d).
93 U.T.R.A. §6(1) ; WIS. STATS. (1953) §241.36(1). Apparently the entruster may
take possession before default if the trust receipt so provides.
94 U.T.R.A. §6(2) provides that "An entruster entitled to possession under the
terms of the trust receipt or of subsection (1) may take possession without
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rights and duties of a pledgee 5 He may, for example, be entitled to
a court order requiring surrender to him of evidence of title, but not
to an order authorizing him to deal with the property as he sees fit.
9 6
When the entruster has gained possession of the property, he may
give notice, on or after default, of his intention to sell the property.
Five days after sending or serving the notice, he may sell the property
at either a public or a private sale; but he may purchase the property
himself only if the sale is publicf' The proceeds of the sale are applied
first to the payment of the expense of the sale, second to the payment
of the expenses of retaking, and third to the satisfaction of the in-
debtedness."' If there is any surplus, the trustee receives the benefit;
if there is any deficiency, the truste is liable.99
C. The Entruster's Rights to Proceeds.
When the trust receipt provides that the trustee is to have no liberty
of disposition, or that he is to account for the proceeds of any disposi-
ion of the subject matter, the entruster has rights to certain of the pro-
ceeds as against all persons with respect to whom his security interest
was valid at the time of the disposition by the trustee, and to the same
extent. 00 In such cases, the entruster will be entitled to any debt due
to the trustee as a result of the disposition, and any security therefor.
However, this right is subject to any set-off or defense which has
accrued in favor of the transferee against the trustee prior to actual
notice of the entruster's interest. 0 1 The entruster is entitled to any
proceeds whatever which are identifiable. 10 2 Furthermore, he has a
right to any proceeds, or the value thereof, whether identifiable or not,
if such proceeds were received within ten days prior to the commence-
ment of any sort of insolvency preceeding; and, in such case, he re-
ceives a priority to the amount of such proceeds or value.10 ' The lien
of the entruster is said to pass from the subject matter of the trust
receipt to the property received as proceeds from the disposition there-
of.'0 4 The Uniform Act, as proposed by the Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws, contains a provision which requires that the en-
legal process, whenever that is possible without breach of the peace." For
some inexplicable reason this provision does not appear in the Wisconsin Act.
95 U.T.R.A. §6(3) (a) ; WIs. STATS. (1953) §241.36(2) (a).
96 Automobile Banking Corp. v. Weicht. 160 Pa.Super. 422, 51 A.2d 4409 (1947).
97U.T.R.A. §6(3) (b) ;WIs. STATS. (1953) §241.36(2) (b). The notice required
must be in writing; it may either be personally served on the trustee, or it may
be sent to his last known address by ordinary mail. U.T.R.A. §6(3) (b) ; Wis.
STATS. (1953) §241.36(2)(c).
9sU.T.R.A. §6(3) (b); Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.36(2) (b).
99 U.T.R.A. §6 (3) (b) ; Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.36 (2) (c).200 U.T.R.A. ,10: Vis. STATS. (1953) §241.40.
102 U.T.R.A. §9(3); WiS. STATS. (1953) §241.39(3).
121J.T.R.A. §10(c) ; Wis. STATS. §241.40.(3).
103 U.T.R.A. §10(b); Wis. STATS. §241.40(2).
104 Peoples Finance and Thrift Co. of Visalia v. Bowman, 58 Cal. App. 2d 729,
137 P.2d 729 (1943).
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truster make demand for the proceeds within ten days after having
gained knowledge of them or be deemed to have waived any right.105
This provision was omitted from the Wisconsin Act.
D. The Right to Provide for Forfeiture.
Apparently, the parties may provide for forfeiture on default in
only one situation: i.e., where the subject matter of the trust receipt is
"style or model" goods.10 6 In such case the trust receipt may validly
provide that the entruster may declare the trustee's interest forfeit, but
the entruster must cancel at least 80% of the purchase price to the
trustee, or the original indebtedness, whichever is greater.10 7 The nature
of the goods which are to fall in this class is not quite clear, but one
writer has attempted to analyze the phrase:
"A great many types of goods are now style or model goods.
Automobiles are produced in annual models; modernistic furni-
ture is style goods. Indeed in a broad sense nearly all manu-
factured articles which are advertised and sold under trade
names might be called style or model goods. Yet the market
price of most such goods remains fairly stable over many
months, even years. It seems to be intended that the one case
in which the trustees may be subjected to a forfeiture is an ex-
ceptional case. Therefore, it is submitted that 'style or model'
goods should be construed to mean only those which may be ex-
pected to be popular for a short season, after which they are
likely to drop out of the market or to considerably depreciate
in value due to the changing fancy of the buyer public."' 0 8
Thus construed, this provision furnishes the entruster with much
needed security in the field of rapidly depreciating merchandise, since
the customary modes of foreclosing the trustee's interest are too slow
to protect the entruster when he has nothing but the goods against
which to proceed.
If the trustee has defaulted, the parties may agree to forfeiture:
the Act provides that after default surrender of the trustee's interest
to the entruster is valid on any terms upon which the parties may
agree, 0 9 whether the subject matter of the trust receipt consist of goods
manufactured by style or model or not.
V
RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES
A. Purchasers from the Trustee.
1. Purchasers of negotiable instruments or documents.
In the case of negotiable instruments or documents, the rights of a
105 U.T.R.A. §10(c).
106 U.T.R.A. §6(5); Wis STATS. (1953) §241.36(4).
107 Ibid. The percentage required to be cancelled declines with the number of re-
newals; for details see that section.
108 Bacon, op. cit. supra note 47, p. 267.
109 U.T.R.A. §6(4); WIs. STATS. (1953) §241.36(3).
1954]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
bona fide purchaser for value are not limited by the Act. Further,
where instruments are purchased and sold as though negotiable, the
rights of a purchaser in good faith for value by transfer in the cus-
tomary manner are likewise not limited. Filing under the Act does not
constitute notice to purchasers in good faith and for value of negotiable
instruments, except transferees in bulk. 110
2. Purchasers in the ordinary course of trade.
When the trustee has liberty of sale, and a purchaser buys in the
ordinary course of trade, the purchaser takes title free of the en-
truster's interest, regardless of whether filing has taken place or
whether the thirty day grace period has expired."" Moreover, no lim-
itation placed on the liberty of the trustee to sell is effective against a
buyer in the ordinary course of trade, unless the buyer has actual
notice of the limitation. 1 2 "Liberty of sale" as used in this section of
the Act means merely "authority to sell." The Act anticipates prob-
lems of estoppel and provides that where the entruster consents to or
allows the trustee's keeping of the goods subject to the trust receipt
in his stock in trade or in his sales or exhibition rooms, the entruster
will be deemed to have granted the trustee liberty of sale.""'
3. Purchasers other than in the ordinary course of trade.
If the entruster files as the Act provides within the thirty day
period, his security interest is good as against all persons except as
otherwise provided by the Act."x4 If the entruster files late, the filing has
like effect, without relation back, as against all persons not having
notice of his interest." 5 Therefore, a purchaser not in the ordinary
course of trade-though he is in good faith and parts with value-
cannot prevail against the entruster if the latter has properly filed.
However, if the entruster has failed to file, he may lose his interest in
the subject matter of the trust receipt to a purchaser from the trustee,
though such purchaser does not purchase in the ordinary course of
business. If such purchaser in good faith without notice of the en-
truster's interest gives new value prior to the expiration of the thirty
day period or gives value, new or otherwise, after the expiration of
such period, and, in either event, obtains possession of the goods be-
fore filing, he will take free of the entruster's interest. If such pur-
chaser is a transferee in bulk, he will take free of the entruster's in-
terest only if he has given value after the expiration of the thirty day
period and has acquired possession of the goods before filing."06
110 U.T.R.A. §9(1) (a) ; Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.39(1) (a).
"'2 U.T.R.A. §9(2) (a) (i) ; Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.39(2) (a) (1).
112 U.T.R.A. §9(2) (a) (i) Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.39(2) (a) (2).
11 U.T.R.A. §9(2) (c) ; Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.39(2) (c).
"14 U.T.R.A. §7(1) (a); Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.37(1) (a).
2L5 U.T.R.A. §7(1) (b); Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.37(1) (b).
128 U.T.R.A. §9(2) (b) ; Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.39(2) (b).
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4. Rights of set-off and defense.
When the entruster avails himself of the rights to the proceeds of
any sale, as described supra in section IV C. of this paper, and de-
mands that the purchaser pay to him any amounts owing to the trustee,
the purchaser is entitled to any set-off or defense which has accrued
in his favor against the trustee prior to his obtaining actual notice of
the entruster's security interest.117
5. Responsibility of the entruster on sales by the trustee.
Even though the entruster has given the trustee liberty of sale, the
Act provides that he is not to be held responsible as principal or as
vendor under any sale or contract to sell made by the trustee.18
B. Creditors of the Trustee.
For thirty days after the delivery of the subject matter to the
trustee, the security interest of the entruster is valid as against all
creditors of the trustee whether they have notice or not." 9 However,
persons who without notice acquire the status of lien creditors after
the expiration of the thirty day period and before filing will prevail
over the entruster 2' The Act provides that
"'Lien creditor' means any creditor who has acquired a specific
lien on the goods, documents or instruments by attachment,, levy
or by any other similar operation of law or judicial process in-
cluding a distraining landlord."' 21
The concept of "lien creditor without notice" is extended to include:
1) an assignee for the benefit of creditors; 2) a receiver in equity; and
3) a trustee in bankruptcy or judicial insolvency proceedings. The fact
that the receiver, assignee or trustee personally has or has not actual
notice of the entruster's interest is deemed immaterial; the representa-
tive of the creditors will prevail over the entruster unless filing has
occurred or possession has been taken by the entruster prior to the
acquisition of notice -by all creditors . 22
When a specific lien has arisen from contractual acts of the trustee
with reference to the processing, warehousing, shipping or otherwise
dealing in the ordinary course of business with the subject matter of
the trust receipt preparatory to its sale, such lien will attach to the
interest of the entruster as well as to that of the trustee, whether or not
filing has occurred. But the entruster is not obligated to pay any debt
secured by the lien.1 23
1"1U.T.R.A. §9(3); WIs. STATS. (1953) §241.39(3).
11s U.T.R.A. §12; WIs. STATS. (1953) §241.42.
119 U.T.R.A. §8(1); WIs. STATS. (1953) §241.38(1).
120 U.T.R.A. §8(2); Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.38(2) (a).
121 U.T.R.A. §1; Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.31(6). Distress for rent, however, is
abolished in Wisconsin. WIs. STATS. (1953) §234.01.
122 U.T.R.A. §8(2) (b), (a) ; WIs. STATS. (1953) §241.38(3), (2).
123 U.T.R.A. §11; Wis. STATS. (1953) §241.41.
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VI
CONCLUSION
In the form adopted by the Wisconsin Legislature, the Trust Re-
ceipts Act provides an especially flexible means of financing the in-
ventories of retail merchants. The liberal provisions of the Act will
most certainly make the trust receipt device more attractive, because
less cumbersome, than the financing methods more usually employed
heretofore. From the standpoint of the parties to the transaction, the
advantages of the trust receipt over the more conventional conditional
sale for resale and chattel mortgage with liberty of sale are clear.
However the Act will present difficulties to credit investigators, be-
cause the extent of the lien upon the merchant's inventory will no
longer be a matter of public record. Subsequent creditors of the
trustee will be forced to accept the word of the trustee or the entruster
as to the amount of the entruster's lien on the trustee's inventory.
The Act itself is a well thought out piece of work, being the product
of over twenty years' development in the hands of the Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws and the legislatures and courts of the nation.
It may be depended upon to provide a fairly adequate legal coverage
of the situations likely to arise in trust receipt financing, and, as is the
case with the other uniform laws, cases from other jurisdiction will be
found valuable in its construction. The chief obstruction to the use of
the trust receipt - the uncertainty of its legal status - having been re-
moved, the use of that device in Wisconsin, especially in the financing
of automobile dealers' inventories, should become quite widespread.
ROBERT H. GoRsKE
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